For non-atomic TU games ν satisfying suitable conditions, the core can be determined by computing appropriate derivatives of ν. Further, such computations yield one of two stark conclusions: either core(ν) is empty or it consists of a single measure that can be expressed explicitly in terms of derivatives of ν. In this sense, core theory for a class of games may be reduced to calculus.
INTRODUCTION

Outline
We show that for large (non-atomic) TU games satisfying suitable conditions, the core can be determined by computing appropriate derivatives of the characteristic function ν. Further, such computations yield one of two stark conclusions: either the core of ν is empty or it consists of a single measure. In the latter case, the core measure is expressed explicitly in terms of derivatives of ν. In this sense, core theory for a class of non-atomic games may be reduced to calculus.
There is simple intuition for a connection between core(ν), assumed for the moment to be nonempty, and the 'derivative' of ν. Denote by Σ the σ-algebra of In particular, A is a minimizer for m(·) − ν(·) over Σ. Analogy with calculus suggests that, if A is suitably 'interior', then the 'derivative' of the noted function should vanish at A. We propose a definition of derivative (or more accurately, differential) for characteristic functions ν. It satisfies the following natural property that might be expected of any notion of differentiation: There is a parallel between standard calculus (for real-valued functions defined on a Euclidean space) and the calculus proposed here (for real-valued functions defined on a σ-algebra of coalitions), in which additive set functions (measures) play the role of linear functions on a Euclidean space. Given such an analogy, then, because m is additive, it equals its differential. Consequently, if we denote the differential of ν at A by δν(·; A), then the first-order condition corresponding to (1.2) takes the form
m(·) = δν(·; A). (1.3)
Finally, suppose that A satisfies (1.1) not only for a particular m in the core, but for all measures in the core. Conclude that the core of ν is {δν(·; A)} and we have a singleton core with an explicit representation in terms of ν. There are two obvious questions regarding this informal argument. First, how restrictive is the assumption that there exists an 'interior' A that satisfies (1.1) for all m in the core? It turns out that this assumption is satisfied by many games of interest, for example in homogeneous measure games, including, in particular, market games.
The second and more difficult question is whether the first-order condition (1.3) can be justified. After all, the fact that the usual first-order condition takes the form of an equality relies heavily on the linear structure of Euclidean space. For example, using the obvious notation, if ∇f (x * ) · y > 0, then one can move from x * in the reverse direction −y and reduce thereby the value of f . By this reasoning, the stated inequality is ruled out if f has a minimum at x * . However, in the present context where the domain is a σ-algebra, there is no counterpart of a 'reverse direction' and first-order conditions take the form of inequalities. Much of the work we do below is to identify added assumptions on games that lead to (1.3) . Primarily, we define a class of so-called coherent games, for which the informal outline above can be made rigorous. As a result, the core of any differentiable coherent game can be determined simply by computing the derivative of its characteristic function. Moreover, the latter task is arguably as routine as differentiating functions defined on a Euclidean space. That is because our derivative notion satisfies counterparts of the rules familar from calculus (the product and chain rules, for example). This is the sense in which core theory for differentiable coherent games is reduced to 'just calculus'.
The introduction of a new calculus into co-operative game theory is our main contribution; we hope that it will prove to be a fruitful tool in the study of non-atomic TU games. We demonstrate its usefulness here by means of the core theorem for abstract (coherent) games that was outlined above and also by means of applications of this general theorem to the more concrete class of measure games. In addition, we provide a new derivation of known results on market games and exchange economies (uniqueness of the core allocation in suitable exchange economies). This new derivation seems to us to be of value because of the radically different and simplifying perspective that it offers relative to the derivations in [2] and also [3] .
Related Literature
We are not the first to adopt calculus techniques in order to study non-atomic TU games. Aumann and Shapley [2] develop a notion of derivative for non-additive set functions and apply it to study both the Shapley value and the core of nonatomic games. The primary intuition underlying their use of differentiability is that the Shapley value of each infinitesimal player is her marginal contribution to the worth of a representative coalition averaged over all such coalitions (see [2, (20.1) ]). Because 'marginal contribution' is most naturally expressed in terms of derivatives, a calculus approach is intuitive. Note that this intuition differs substantially from that underlying our analysis; in particular, it focuses on the Shapley value rather than the core.
One consequence of this difference in motivation is that Aumann and Shapley take a class of games as the primary object of study, while we focus on individual games. The first approach is natural for study of the Shapley value which is defined by its properties over a class; but not so for study of the core, where it is desirable to have an approach that is applicable to any given single game. Our notion of derivative is such a game-by-game tool.
There are other (related) differences. Roughly, the Aumann-Shapley definition begins with the subspace pN A of games (the closed subspace of BV spanned by all powers of positive nonatomic measures measures). The authors show (Theorem G) that each game or non-additive set function ν in pN A admits a suitable extension to an 'integral' ν * . Because an integral can be viewed as a functional on the linear space of integrands (real-valued random variables), a Gateaux-like derivative notion can be defined in the usual way and this is adequate for characterization of the Shapley value (Theorem H). However, in order to check whether a given game ν is differentiable and then to compute its derivative, one must determine whether ν lies in pN A and if so, determine the corresponding integral ν * . Neither of these steps is routine in general. The above analysis admits generalizations -for example, domains larger than pN A can be accommodated (Section 22 and [7] , for example) and the Gâteaux derivative can be related to a Fréchet-type notion (Section 24) -but the above noted difficulties persist.
Even more important than tractability is that at the level of abstract games, the Aumann-Shapley approach leads to the formulation of assumptions about games through restrictions on their extensions. However, it is often difficult to understand the meaning of such restrictions in terms of the assumptions they embody about the underlying game.
1 In contrast, we define derivative explicitly in terms of the given ν. Then we formulate coherence and other assumptions about games in terms of these derivatives. This approach permits interpretation much as restrictions on derivatives in ordinary calculus are often readily interpreted.
Other related literature includes work by Rosenmuller [11] , who defines differentiability for large games. Our derivative notion is inspired by his, particularly by his use of partitions, but the two notions differ. Though Rosenmuller is also concerned with the core of TU games (albeit only convex games), neither our results nor the underlying intuition are apparent in [11] .
The notion of derivative that we use here originates in [4] in a decision theory context, where instead of being a game, the set function ν is a 'non-additive probability' as in [13] . A related notion is developed and applied to decision theory in [6] .
PRELIMINARIES
The set of players is Ω and the σ-algebra Σ denotes the set of admissible coalitions. Subsets of Ω are understood to be in Σ even where not stated explicitly and they are referred to both as sets and as coalitions.
A set function ν :
for all pairwise disjoint sets A and B,
continuous if it is continuous at every A,
The set of all additive (countably additive) games that are bounded with respect to the variation norm is denoted F A (CA). An additive game m is convex-ranged if for all α ∈ (0, 1) and all A ∈ Σ with |m| (A) > 0, there exists B ⊂ A such that |m| (B) = α |m| (A). Denote by NA the set of all additive convex-ranged games. If m = (m 1 , ..., m N ), where each m i is an additive convexranged game, then by a version of the Lyapunov Theorem [9, Theorem 11.4.9] , the range R (m) = {m (A) : A ∈ Σ} is a convex subset of R N . Throughout the paper when we refer to 'the Lyapunov Theorem', the intention is to this version.
The core of ν ∈ V is
We fix also some terminology and notation for functions defined on a Euclidean
where
N is the gradient of g at x. If A is an arbitrary subset of R N , not necessarily open, say that the function g : A → R is differentiable on A if it can be extended to a differentiable function on some open set U containing A.
DIFFERENTIABLE GAMES
be a finite partition of A. Denote by A j,λ λ the net of all finite partitions of A, where λ > λ implies that the partition corresponding to λ refines that corresponding to λ.
For all the results to follow, we could adopt a weaker 'one-sided' definition of derivative. Define an outer derivative at E, denoted δ + ν (·; E), by
and an inner derivative at E, denoted δ − ν (·; E), by
Because a difference quotient is not apparent in the defining condition, it may be comforting to make the following observation: For a function ϕ : R 1 −→ R 1 that is differentiable at some x in the usual sense, elementary algebraic manipulation of the definition of the derivative ϕ (x) yields the following expression paralleling (3.1):
where the convergence is required to hold for each F and G as above. Given the existence of δ + ν (·; E) and δ − ν (·; E), one could define δν (·; E) as the sum δ + ν (·; E) + δ − ν (·; E), in which case (3.1) is satisfied when E is perturbed by either F or G, but not necessarily when perturbed by both simultaneously.
3
Turn to interpretation. Roughly, δν (·; E) approximates the marginal value of coalitions relative to the base coalition E, in such a way that the approximation is additive (across disjoint incremental coalitions) and becomes exact in the limit for 'small' coalitions. 4 To elaborate, for F disjoint from E, approximate the incremental value of F as follows: Partition F into arbitrarily small subcoalitions F j,λ and compute the marginal value 
which provides the sense in which δν (A; E) represents the total marginal value of A relative to the base coalition E.
5
A crucial feature of our notion of differentiability for games is that it satisfies many of the properties familiar from calculus, including a form of the Chain Rule as well as 'sum' and 'product' rules (see Appendix A). 6 Bounded and convexranged measures play the role of linear functions in calculus; in particular, if m is such a measure, then it is differentiable at any E and δm (·; E) = m (·). Modulo this translation, formulae familiar from calculus are valid also for games. For example, if ν(·) equals the product p(·) q(·) of two convex-ranged measures, then
for all E. More general formulae arise in the context of measure games. In the context of measure games g(P ), this would permit weakening our assumptions on g to require only that it have one-sided derivatives.
4 'Smallness' is measured via fineness of partitions, which relies on the richness of Σ; indeed, if Σ is finite, then only additive games are differentiable. 5 The counterparts for finite games are Σ i∈F (ν(E ∪ {i)) − ν(E)) and Σ i∈G (ν(E) − ν(E − {i})) for δν (F ; E) and δν (G; E) respectively. 6 The appendix also contains some information about the connection with the AumannShapley style derivative.
7 See Appendix A.3 for an example of a differentiable game that is not a measure game.
Measure Games
The game ν : Σ → R is a measure game if there exist a vector charge (that is, a finitely additive vector measure) P = (P 1 , ..., P N ) : Σ → R N + , with P (Ω) = 0 and with each P i : Σ → R + bounded and convex-ranged, and a function g :
When N = 1, ν = g (P (·)) is called a scalar measure game.
Though the proof is routine, we provide it here because it may help clarify for the reader the definition of differentiability and convince her of our claim that the calculus of games is analogous to the calculus of functions on Euclidean space.
Since each P i is convex-ranged on the σ-algebra Σ, by the Lyapunov Theorem there exist finite partitions F
and so, for all λ > λ 0 ,
LINEAR SETS AND CORE BOUNDS
Our focus in this paper is to relate core(ν) to the derivative of ν. We begin with an important preliminary relation and some immediate implications. The lemma describes inequalities that represent first-order conditions for (1.2).
Lemma 4.1. Let A ∈ Σ and m ∈ core(ν) be such that m(A) = ν(A). Then
We make heavy use of this lemma. Also important is the notion of a linear coalition (or set).
Definition 4.2. The coalition A ∈ Σ is linear with respect to the game ν if
Given the binary partition of Ω into the linear coalitions A and A c , there is no gain (or loss) in forming the grand coalition.
8 Denote by A the collection of all linear coalitions; A contains both ∅ and Ω. The importance of linear coalitions for our purposes is that they deliver (1.1) which is an important part of our approach to determining the core. This fact and more are established in the next lemma.
in addition, ν is superadditive and either (i) ν is continuous, or (ii) the partition is finite, then
Proof. Evidently,
that ν is superadditive and continuous (the finite partition case is trivial). For convenience, consider A 1 . We have
For linear sets, Lemma 4.1 takes the following stronger form that is a direct consequence of the two preceding lemmas.
Lemma 4.4. Let A ∈ A. For any suitably differentiable ν and m
For any linear set A, these inequalities define bounds on elements of core(ν), that is, for any E,
In particular, because the empty set is linear, one obtains the bound
An implication is that every measure in core(ν) is absolutely continuous with respect to δν (·; Ω). Further implications constitute necessary conditions for nonemptiness of the core; for example, nonemptiness requires that (for all linear A and for all E)
COHERENT GAMES Definition 5.1. A game
Defer interpretation for a moment and observe that: (i) ν is coherent at A if and only if it is coherent at A c ; and (ii) ν is coherent at Ω (and at ∅) if and only if
As an example, consider the measure game g (P ), where g is differentiable at 0 and at
In particular, this is true if g is nonnegative-valued and homogeneous of degree k ∈ [0, 1] (by Euler's Theorem) or if g is concave, in which case
To understand the meaning of coherence, recall the intuition sketched in the introduction surrounding the optimization problem (1.2) and the need to convert the (first-order) inequalities in Lemma 4.1 into an equality such as (1.3). Roughly, the obstacle is the apparent lack of a notion of 'reversal in direction'. The sense in which a reversal is possible is that the subtraction of any G ⊂ A from A is tantamount to the addition of G to A c . This trivial observation can be exploited if δν(·; A) and δν(·; A c ) are suitably related -and that is the role of coherence. Thus, for example, (5.1) requires that if δν(A; A) is large in the sense of being larger than ν(A), then (ignoring the distinction between strict and weak inequalities) so is δν(A; A c ). In terms of the interpretation offered earlier for derivatives, if the value of A is less than the total marginal value of A relative to the base coalition A, corresponding to the effect of removing the players in A, then the same must be true when the total marginal value is computed relative to A c as the base coalition, corresponding to the effect of adding the players in A to A c . (The second condition (5.2) requires the same for A c .) The consistent relative evaluation of the total marginal contribution of A suggests the name consistency; we employ 'coherence' because consistency has other meanings in co-operative game theory.
At a formal level, one might wonder about the variations of (5.1) and (5.2) obtained by reversing the directions of all inequalities; after all, these also express a form of consistency in the evaluation of the total marginal contribution of A. In fact, these conditions are implied (even without coherence) if ν has a nonempty core, because then, by Lemma 4.4,
The intuition in the introduction relies also on a coalition A having the property (1.1), which is true for linear sets, by Lemma 4.3. Call the game ν coherent if it is coherent at some linear set A (which presumes differentiability at A and A c ). For coherent games, we do not obtain (1.3); it is not surprising that the calculus intuition is imperfect. However, we can prove that the core is either empty or that it is a singleton having an explicit representation in terms of the derivatives of ν. 
In particular, coherence at some linear coalition implies that the core is either empty or equals a singleton. Conversely, coherence at A is also necessary for the representation (5.5).
In the latter representation, two coefficients equal 1 and two equal 0, which leads to 4 possibilities in total, corresponding to the fact that there are 4 distinct ways in which coherence at A can be satisfied. These and their corresponding representations are:
Note that the first representation corresponds to (1.3), but that the surrounding intuition described in the introduction is consistent also with the three other representations.
Proof. (i) =⇒ (ii):
We use repeatedly the following elementary Fact: Given E ∈ Σ, if p and q are two measures satisfying
by Lemma 4.3. Therefore, by Lemma 4.4, we have both
and, taking F = A c and G = A, The implication (ii) =⇒ (iii) is obvious.
Several applications of the theorem are provided below in the context of more concrete (e.g., measure or market) games. Conclude this section with an application at the level of abstract games. Then
The condition (5.14) is a simple formal condition that relates the derivatives at A and A c , thus connecting with our central intuition. As a simple illustration, consider the scalar measure game ν (·) = g (P (·)), where g is monotone and both g (P (A)) and g (P (Ω) − P (A)) exist and are nonzero. Then condition (5.14) is satisfied because
Suppose that A is a linear set for ν. It follows from the Corollary that if 0 (ii) By Lemma A.5,
for all E ∈ Σ. Thus the game ν is nonnegative. Furthermore,
Hence, A is linear for ν and 0 < ν (A) < ν (Ω). Let m (·) ∈ core(ν). Then m (·) + |δν| (·; ∅) ∈ core(ν ), and so, by the preceding argument for monotone games,
which evidently leads to (5.15).
APPLICATIONS
Thus far we have been dealing with abstract games. We turn now to applications to more concrete specializations.
Market Games and Exchange Economies
Definition 6.1. A market game is a positive superadditive measure game g (P ) : Σ → R, where g : R (P ) → R is homogeneous of degree one. 10 Market games play a fundamental role in co-operative game theory (see [2, Ch. 6 ], for example). As an immediate consequence of Theorem 5.2, we can prove the following result for such games:
Hence, ν is coherent at Ω. By Theorem 5.2, see (5.6) in particular, core (ν) = {δν (·; Ω)} if δν (·; Ω) ∈ core (ν). Therefore, to complete the proof it suffices to show that δν (·; Ω) ∈ core (ν).
We know that δν (Ω; Ω) = ν (Ω). Let E ∈ Σ with P (E) = 0. By the Lyapunov Theorem, for each t ∈ (0, 1) there exists B t such that P (B t ) = tP (E). Hence, by superadditivity,
and by homogeneity,
An important special case of a market game is provided by an exchange economy. An exchange economy of finite type consists of: Consider the game defined by
Because of type-symmetry of the relevant allocations, the above game is a market game. Indeed, ν (E) = g (P (E)) for all E ∈ Σ, where:
Under suitable conditions, spelled out in [2, pp. 234-41], g is differentiable at P (Ω). Under those conditions, therefore, the core of a market game ν is the singleton as in (6.1). This is essentially a result of [2, Ch. 6] and it plays a key role in their analysis of exchange economies. Our contribution is to show how it can be derived from an approach based primarily on the elementary and familiar perspective provided by calculus.
The Core of Measure Games
As Hart and Neyman observe [5, p. 32] "in many applications, one usually encounters games ... that depend on finitely many measures." Therefore, we provide some results that apply to a broad class of measure games.
Definition 6.3. The measure game g (P ) : Σ → R is a Dini measure game if lim inf |x|→0 g(x) |x|
> −∞, where |·| is any norm on R N .
12
Special cases include 12 We call them Dini games because lim inf |x|→0
|x| is the lower Dini derivative of g at 0.
(i) all positive measure games, since g ≥ 0 implies that lim inf |x|→0
(ii) all measure games g (P ) such that g : R N → R is differentiable at 0.
We make use also of special categories of sets or coalitions, called diagonal and pivotal respectively, that we now introduce. Let P : Σ → R N be a finitely additive vector measure with each measure P i convex-ranged. Given any two distinct sets E , E ∈ Σ, with P (E ) ≤ P (E ), the set E , E ≡ {E ∈ Σ : P (E) = tP (E ) + (1 − t) P (E ) for some t ∈ (0, 1)} , is called the segment joining E and E ; it is nonempty by the Lyapunov Theorem.
13
P (E) = t P (Ω) for some 0 < t < 1, which expresses a sense in which E is a representative subcoalition of Ω. Say that E is pivotal if there exist linear sets A and A such that A ∈ ∅, E and A ∈ E, Ω .
Remarks: There exists a linear and diagonal set if and only if Ω is pivotal.
14 Thus, assuming that there exists a (linear and) pivotal set is weaker than assuming that there exists a (linear and) diagonal set; see Theorems 6.4 and 6.5 below. It is easy to see that Ω is pivotal if and only if ∅ is pivotal. For scalar measure games, Ω is pivotal iff there exists a linear set A such that 0 < P (A) < P (Ω).
Our first result exploits the fact that the coherence required by Theorem 5.2 is implied by the existence of a linear and diagonal set.
Theorem 6.4. Let ν = g (P ) : Σ → R be a Dini measure game with P countably additive and g bounded below. Let A be a linear and diagonal set and suppose that ν is differentiable at A and at A
c . Then core (ν) = ∅ or core (ν) = {δν (·; A)} . 13 Adopt the convention that E, E = {∅} for all E ∈ Σ. 14 In fact, E ∈ ∅, Ω and ∅ ∈ Ω, Ω = ∅, ∅ , so that we can take A = E and A = ∅.
The Theorem applies in particular to games g(P ) where g : R (P ) → R is homogeneous of degree one and g (0, ..., 0) = 0, because such games admit many sets that are linear and diagonal. In fact, by the Lyapunov Theorem, for each α ∈ (0, 1) there exists B α ∈ Σ such that P i (B α ) = αP i (Ω) for 1 ≤ i ≤ N . Therefore,
Hence, each B α is linear and diagonal. Conclude from the Theorem that if the core is nonempty (and given differentiability of g at P (Ω)), then
As noted above, there exists a linear and diagonal set if and only if Ω is pivotal. We can weaken this requirement and assume only that there exists some pivotal set, not necessarily Ω, if we restrict attention to games g (P ) such that either g is convex or g(P ) is totally balanced.
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Theorem 6.5. Let ν = g (P ) : Σ → R be a Dini measure game with P countably additive. Let A be a linear and pivotal set and suppose that ν is differentiable at A and at A c .
(i) If g is convex and bounded below, then
(
ii) If ν is totally balanced, then
15 Recall that a game is totally balanced iff all its subgames have nonempty cores. For a scalar measure game, g (P ) is convex if and only if g : [0, P (Ω)] → R is convex. This is not true for N > 1. For example, if g (x 1 , x 2 ) = x 2 1 + x 2 2 , then by Theorem 5.2, core (g (P )) ⊆ 1 √ 2 (P 1 (·) + P 2 (·)) . Hence, g (P ) has at most a singleton core and so it is not convex as, otherwise, it would be additive. In fact, core (g (P )) = ∅.
We describe one more result for Dini measure games. Say that the measure game g (P ) is super-homogeneous of degree k > 0 at the set E if g (αP (E)) ≥ α k g (P (E)) for all α ∈ (0, 1). For example, if g : R(P ) → R + is concave with g (0) = 0, then g (P ) is homogeneous of degree k ≥ 1 at every E. This property implies (given auxiliary assumptions) that g(P ) is coherent at Ω and hence permits application of Theorem 5.2. More precisely, we can prove: Theorem 6.6. Let ν = g (P ) : Σ → R be a Dini measure game with g differentiable at P (Ω).
(a) Suppose that ν is super-homogeneous of degree k ∈ [0, 1] at P (Ω) and that either g is bounded below or that ν is superadditive.
(b) Suppose that g is bounded below and that ν is super-homogeneous of degree 1 at every E ∈ Σ. Then the following statements are equivalent:
(ii) core (ν) = {δν (·; Ω)}.
It is noteworthy that this theorem requires differentiability of g only at the single point P (Ω). This feature makes possible the following generalization: By the Rademacher Theorem, locally Lipschitzian functions (a large class that includes convex functions) are differentiable everywhere outside a Lebesgue measure zero subset D ⊆ R N ; for convex functions, the set D is first category in R N (see [ Proof. Let δ 1 ν (·; E) and δ 2 ν (·; E) be derivatives. For any G ⊂ E, we have:
. A similar argument holds for all F ⊂ E c . By additivity, it then follows that δ 1 ν (·; E) = δ 2 ν (·; E). Proposition A.2. Suppose ν 1 , ν 2 ∈ V are two games differentiable at E ∈ Σ. Then both ν 1 + ν 2 and ν 1 ν 2 are differentiable at E, and
Proof. We provide the proof of (ii): By adding and subtracting
we obtain:
By definition,
On the other hand,
Let ε > 0. There exists λ 1 such that, for all λ > λ 1 ,
Since the derivatives are convex-ranged, there exists λ 2 such that |δν 2 
Since the derivatives are bounded measures, it follows that
which completes the proof of (ii).
Proposition A.3. Let ν be differentiable at E ∈ Σ. If ν is monotone, then δν (·; E) is a nonnegative measure.
Proof. Let F ⊂ E c . Then, by monotonicity,
and so −δν (F ; E) ≤ 0, i.e., δν (F ; E) ≥ 0. Now, let G ⊂ E. Again by monotonicity,
and so −δν (G; E) ≤ 0, i.e., δν (G; E) ≥ 0. By the additivity of δν (·; E), it follows that δν (·; E) ≥ 0.
A.2. Chain Rule
Proposition A.4. Let ν : Σ → R be differentiable at E ∈ Σ, and g :
Proof. We have
In particular,
Let η > 0. By (A.1), there exists λ 1 such that, for all λ > λ 1 and all
Moreover, since δν (·; E) is convex-ranged, there exists a finite partition of
and so
Hence, by setting λ δ
On the other hand, since the derivative g (ν (E)) exists, given any ε > 0 there exists η ε > 0 such that
But, by the definition of δν (·; E), given any ε > 0, there exists λ 0 such that
for some K < ∞ that is independent of λ, F and G, as provided by the boundedness of the measure δν(·; E). Conclude that, given any ε > 0,
as desired.
A.3. Miscellaneous Facts
Lemma A.5. Let ν : Σ → R be a superadditive game differentiable at ∅. Then
for all E ∈ Σ.
Remark. This lemma generalizes the fact that for superadditive real-valued functions g : [0, 1] → R, we have
for all x ∈ [0, 1], whenever g (0) = lim x↓0 g (x) /x exists. In fact, let ν = g (P ) : Σ → R be the scalar measure game defined through g. The Chain Rule (Proposition A.4), and Lemma A.5 imply that
Proof. For any E ∈ Σ,
= 0, and so δν(E; ∅) ≤ ν (E).
Next we describe an example of a differentiable game that is not a measure game: Fix any ordered sequence (p 1 , p 2 , ..., p n , . ..) of countably additive probability measures and define the game ν by
is differentiable by the product rule and the sum of these derivatives yields δν(·; E). The game ν is not a measure game if there is no finite linear basis for {p n (·)}.
Suppose that all the measures p n assign the same probability p(A) to some specific A. Then A is a linear set for the transformed game ν * = log (1 + ν) (ν * (A) = p(A)); and ν * is differentiable by the Chain Rule.
A.4. Automorphisms
Derivatives are invariant to a 'renaming' of agents in the following sense: Call the function θ : Ω → Ω an automorphism of Ω if it is Σ-measurable and bijective, that is, if it is a permutation over Ω. Let Θ be the group of all Σ-measurable
for all E ∈ Σ [2, p. 15]. Evidently, for any F and partition
is a subnet of the net of all finite partitions of θ (F ): Let {A j } be any finite partition of θ (F ). We want to show that there is some partition of θ (F ) of the form θ F 
Proof.
The latter converges to 0 if ν is differentiable at θ (E) because θ F λ,j and θ G λ,j are subnets of the nets of all finite partitions of θ (F ) and θ (G) respectively.
A.5. Connection with Aumann-Shapley
Let B 1 denote the set {f ∈ B(Ω, Σ) : 0 ≤ f ≤ 1}. Aumann and Shapley show (Theorem G, p. 144) that each ν in pN A has an extension to a unique 'integral' ν * : B 1 −→ R 1 satisfying specified properties. In particular, for any measure game ν = g(P ) where g is a polynomial function and P = (P 1 , ..., P N ) is nonatomic, then
where P * (f ) = (P * 1 (f ), ..., P * N (f )) and P * i (f ) = Ω f dP i for f ∈ B 1 . It follows from the sum and product rules for differentiation that for all such polynomial measure games, G ⊂ E and
and both derivatives exist. More generally, for any 0 < t ≤ 1 and set E t satisfying P (E t ) = tP (E),
provided that the range of P (·) is full-dimensional. Gateaux derivatives like those on the right are the calculus tool used by Aumann and Shapley. We do not know how our derivative δν n (·; ·) behaves along a suitably convergent sequence of games {ν n }. Thus it is not clear how the above connection made for polynomial games might extend to games in pN A.
B. APPENDIX
This appendix proves Theorems 6.4 and 6.5, beginning with some common lemmas.
B.1. Common Lemmas
Lemma B.1. Let ν = g (P ) : Σ → R be a Dini measure game with core (ν) = ∅. Suppose that either ν is superadditive or that g is bounded below. Then there exists a positive integer k such that the game ν
Proof. Let |·| p be the norm defined by
Since all norms in R N are equivalent, it is easy to see that, for any norm |·|,
Therefore, lim inf |x| p →0
g(x) |x| p > −∞ for any Dini game g (P ). Assume first that g is bounded below, i.e., inf x∈R(
Next consider the case where ν is superadditive. Given M , choose ε as above satisfying (B.1). For x ∈ R (P ) \ {0}, let E ∈ Σ be such that P (E) = x. By the Lyapunov Theorem there exists a partition
Lemma B.2. Let ν and ν * be as in Lemma B.1. Then:
A is linear with respect to ν * if and only if it is linear with respect to ν.
ν is coherent at A ∈ A if and only if ν * is coherent at A.
Proof. The first two assertions are easily proven. For coherence, it suffices to see that
The subset of core(ν) consisting of countably additive measures is the σ-core and is denoted by 
. Proceeding in this way, either we find a set B ⊆ E such that 0 < m(B) < m(E) or we can construct a chain
{E
n } n≥1 such that δν (E n ; A) = 1 2 n δν (E; A) and m (E n ) = m(E) for all n ≥ 1. Hence, because n≥1 E n ∈ Σ and n≥1 E n ⊆ E, we have δν n≥1 E n ; A = 0 and m n≥1 E n = m(E) > 0, a contradiction. Conclude that there exists some set B ⊆ E such that 0 < m(B) < m(E), and that m has no atoms in A.
Next replace A by A c and use the convex range of δν(·; A c ) to deduce in a similar fashion that m has no atoms in A c . Now, suppose that E is an atom for m in Σ. By definition, either 
Proof.
Let m ∈ core (ν). Suppose (i) is true. Since ν is differentiable at A, it is continuous at A. 
B.2. Proof of Theorem 6.4
Prove the result first for ν ≥ 0. Since the game is differentiable at A and A c , by Lemmas B.3 and B.4 every m ∈ core (ν) is non-atomic and countably additive.
Suppose that core (ν) = ∅. By Lemma B.3, every all measure in core (ν) is convex-ranged. For convenience, assume that
N and let m ∈ core (ν).
Since A ∈ ∅, Ω , P (A) / ∈ {0, P (Ω)}. Hence, by reversing the roles of A and A c if necessary, we can assume that αP (A) = P (A c ) for some α ∈ (0, 1). By the Lyapunov Theorem applied to the N + 1 dimensional vector measure (P, m), there exists Σ E ⊂ A such that P (E) = αP (A) and m (E) = αm (A). Hence,
, that is, δν (A; A) ≤ ν (A). On the other hand, by Lemma 4.1, δν (A; A) ≥ ν (A), and so δν (A;
This completes the proof for ν ≥ 0. Let ν * be the positive game provided by Lemma B.1. By Lemma B.2, core (ν) = ∅ implies core (ν * ) = ∅. Moreover, it is easy to check that A ∈ ∅, Ω with respect to ν * and that ν * is differentiable at A and A c . Hence ν * is coherent at A when core (ν) = ∅; and ν is coherent at A by Lemma B.2. In particular, it is now easy to see that core (ν) ⊂ {δν (·; A)}.
B.3. Proof of Theorem 6.5
Prove statement (i) for ν ≥ 0. By Lemmas B.3 and B.4, every m ∈ core (ν) is countably additive and non-atomic.
There exists α ∈ (0, 1) such that P (A ) = αP (A). Apply the Lyapunov Theorem to (P, m), where m ∈ core (ν). There exists Σ A α ⊂ A be such that P (A α ) = αP (A) and m (A α ) = αm (A). Because P (A ) = P (A α ) and consequently, P ((A ) c ) = P (A = αg (P (Ω)) + (1 − α) g (x) , a contradiction. Therefore,
Since g is differentiable at x, this implies that ∇g (x) P (A c ) = g (P (A c )), that is, δν (A c ; A) = ν (A c ). Conclude that ν is coherent at A.
This completes the proof for the case ν ≥ 0. Let ν * be the positive game provided by Lemma B.1 (such a ν * exists because g is bounded below). By Lemma B.2, core (ν) = ∅ implies core (ν * ) = ∅. Hence, by what has been proven above, ν * is coherent at A if core (ν) = ∅. Again by Lemma B.2, this implies that ν is coherent at A if core (ν) = ∅. Consequently, core (ν) = {δν (·; A)}.
Next prove statement (ii). We first prove the following claim: Claim. Let ν = g (P ) : Σ → R be a totally balanced Dini measure game. Then g (βx) ≤ βg (x) for all β ∈ [0, 1]. Proof of the Claim. Suppose that ν ≥ 0. Let E ∈ Σ be such that P (E) = x. It is easy to see that the subgame ν |E is superadditive. In addition, its dual ν |E is subadditive. In fact, for any pair E 1 , E 2 of disjoint sets in Σ E , there exists a measure m such that m (E 1 ∪ E 2 ) = ν |E (E 1 ∪ E 2 ) and m (E) ≤ ν |E (E) for all
g (x i ) and
Moreover, for all α, β ∈ [0, 1], g (αx) ≤ g (βx) if α ≤ β: Let E ∈ Σ and P (E) = βx. By the Lyapunov Theorem there exists Σ E ⊂ E such that P (E ) = This completes the proof for ν ≥ 0. Since ν is superadditive, we can use Lemma B.1, and thus the extension to Dini games is evident.
B.4. Proof of Theorem 6.6
Part (a): We first prove the result for ν ≥ 0. Under (ii), it is easy to see that ∇g (P (Ω)) P (Ω) ≤ g (P (Ω)), that is δν (Ω; Ω) ≤ ν (Ω). Hence, by (5.3) ν is coherent at Ω, so that by Theorem 5.2, core (ν) = ∅ if and only if core (ν) = {δν (·; Ω)}. As to (i), suppose that k < 1. By the Lyapunov Theorem, for each α ∈ (0, 1) there is A α ∈ Σ such that P (A α ) = αP (Ω). We have,
g (P (Ω)) − (1 − tα) g (P (Ω)) t = αg (P (Ω)) , and so ∇g (P (Ω)) P (A α ) < αg (P (Ω)), which implies ∇g (P (Ω)) P (Ω) < g (P (Ω)). Hence, ν is coherent at Ω but δν (·; Ω) / ∈ core (ν). By Theorem 5.2, core (ν) = ∅. This completes the proof for positive measure games. Now, let ν be any Dini game and let ν * be the positive game provided by Lemma B.1. It is easy to check that ν * is super-homogeneous of degree k ∈ [0, 1] at P (Ω). Hence, core (ν * ) ⊂ {δν * (·; Ω)} if k = 1 and core (ν * ) = ∅ if k < 1. By Lemma B.2, core (ν) ⊂ {δν (·; Ω)} if k = 1 and core (ν) = ∅ if k < 1.
Part (b):
The only non-trivial part is that (iii) implies (ii). By Theorem 6.6, it suffices to show that δν (·; Ω) ∈ core (ν). Since δν (Ω; Ω) = ν (Ω), this can be shown by proceeding as in the proof of Corollary 6.2, which needs only that ν (E) + ν (E c ) ≤ ν (Ω) for all E ∈ Σ.
